Death of groupe mobile 100 (scen#97)

[FJ_MD]

I played this scenario by French side




1) without knowing Vietnamese forces

2) without re-playing any turn

3) 100% realism


My final result was not that great but, here they are! Take a look at the attachment and try to do your best!

[scJazz]

Pretty awesome result. IRL the decimation of Mobile Group 100 signaled the final retreat of the French and ended a whole bunch of careers.

That the US ignored this amazing screwup and deployed a bunch of armor and put Westmoreland <-- tank head in charge just compounded the amazing clusterscrew which was the Vietnam Conflict.

[Starmyth]

Just finished reading "When Presidents Lie". The US military was shafted before the conflict started and then throughout.

[wulfir]

Gave it a go! http://forum.shrapnelgames.com/images/smilies/wink.gif

Did take some losses, particulary in the begining but in the open ground the VietMinh just couldn't match the massive firepower of the French.

[FJ_MD]

I must have acted too cautiously! My preoccupation was to mantain the initial positions but I have not used at best the reinforcements... well, you know, you have played it... and with an outstanding result! http://forum.shrapnelgames.com/images/smilies/smile.gif

[wulfir]

Regarding GM100, stumbled across this:


One series of battles in particular stood out from all the rest, epitomizing the French experience in American eyes.


Entitled "End of a Task Force," Chapter 9 of Fall's widely read book traced a six-month period in the final struggles of a French mobile striking force, Groupement Mobile 100. The vivid and terrifying story of this group's final days seemed to many to describe the fate in store for any armored unit that tried to fight insurgents in the jungles.


Actually Groupement Mobile 100 was not an armored unit at all, but an infantry task force of 2,600 men, organized into four truck-mounted infantry battalions, reinforced with one artillery battalion and ten light tanks. Restricted to movement on roads, deploying to fight on foot, it was extremely vulnerable to ambush, and, indeed, a series of ambushes finally destroyed it.


Because most readers did not take the time to understand the organization and actions of Groupement Mobile 100, its fate cast a pall over armored operations in Vietnam for almost twelve years. The story of this disaster became a major source for unfavorable references to French armored operations in Vietnam, and contributed much to the growing myth of the impossibility of conducting mounted combat in Vietnam.


In fact, the myth was so widely accepted that it tended to overshadow French successes as well as some armored exploits of the Vietnamese Army, and it actually delayed development of Vietnamese armored forces.


Unfortunately, U.S. commanders were to repeat many of the mistakes of the French when American armored units were employed



CMH (http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/mounted/chapter1.htm#b1)

[FJ_MD]

Fantastic document you have found! As a matter of fact the French OOB of the scenario is nearly historical!

[javaman63]

All,

For an interesting read, check out this document

http://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/ArmorMag/jf01/1french01.pdf

[RecruitMonty]

Seems to me the French made the same mistakes they made in WWII. They dispersed their armour too thinly and (most likely) picked the wrong places for deployment. Back in WWII they had a load of tanks in 1940 but they concentrated more on using their armour in a supporting role.

In French Indo-China they made similar mistakes. Although the conditons on the ground were very different it would have made more sense if the Armour had been kept in reserve and used on the bigger operations en masse (if possible). The isolated outposts didn't need Chafees, they needed .30Cal./.50Cal. MGs and a load of light artillery (mortars and smaller howitzers etc). After all the smaller outposts were there to soak up local attacks, weren't they?
No the French needed a decent and heavy mobile reserve.