Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

Some observations on the war in Ukraine.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bws...vNWNCdVFB/view


The author claims

- the APC/IFV is too vulnerable.
- Ukr infantry often attacks dismounted, or sometimes split up squads into two APCs/IFVs to reduce losses causing higher strain on support services.
- Modern Main Battle Tanks have enough protection against the majority of inf-ATGM/RPG type weapons to again be King of the Battlefild. ("Yom Kippur reversed").
- Russians use massive amounts of drones in combination with heavy artillery strikes. Low reaction times before arty strike. Russian arty supposedly killed of two Ukr Mech Inf Bn's at Zellenopillya within a few minutes(?)
- Ukranian fighting morale not broken despite setbacks and lack of modern gear...

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

Sort of confirms what I'd always suspected about IFV's in general. Thanks for this, Wulfir.

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

With the proliferation of cheap infantry AT weapons (LAAW, RPG) most APC/IFVs have even less business on the front lines then they did when 37mm AT guns were commonplace.

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

And people moaned that CM artillery is to powerful. This is similar to how I thought US Cavalry formations are supposed to operate. Decimate the opposition with artillery & the ground units stop what makes it through.

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

Well, what do you expect when all you have is BMP-2s (14.3 tonnes) and BTR-70/80s (13.6 tonnes) in quantity?

Essentially anything can puncture them.

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

I remember when some military expert said in Finnish TV interview 2014 that "it's impossible deal with 80's equipment against modern 2010's equipment"... I think that the greatest error what Ukraine did is going back to T-64 type tanks from T-80 types (during 90's). Just because costs of tank support. And same thing with APC's too. Sad but true.

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

Not knowing anything about the author(s) I was surprised to read about the use of the SPA Gun 2S1 in the assault gun and anti-tank role by both the Russians and Ukranians...(?)

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

No surprise there, mentioned by Isby in his book "Weapons and tactics of the Soviet Army", 1981. His schematic of the attack shows the attached battery of 122mm SP following 3-4000 yards behind.

USSR is quite happy even to use towed 122mm firing over open sights in an attack support mode, and they also use the current SPAs for that job as well, just like they used the SUs in WW2.

Makes sense, if fighting on open terrain where you can see for greater distances than inf-ATGM range (circa 2000m) to hold back just outside that and pulverise any that do show themselves. SP 122mm can displace more easily than the towed ones of course.

Against that, I suppose the light inf-atgm should be positioning themselves behind blocking terrain (hills, woods, villages) , aiming to fire flanking shots into the exposed flanks of any penetrations made.

122mm HE is a decent killer of lightly armoured vehicles as well, according to the report. It is also good in the game I have found against tin-plated APC and IFV. But then again, in WW2 I am perfectly happy to fire SU-152 HE onto tigers. The 6 inch bricks can deal with them, and it clears any surrounding infantry at the same time while at least giving the big cats a headache!;)

In MBT, I generally prefer cheap light tin-plated APCS like the BTR-60/80s or Saracens, to give my guys protected mobility only. I also tend to get the grunts out and walk over the last few yards too, using the mobility to get to a hidden debussing point near to the objective. I'm not a great fan of tin-plated IFV, nor any IFV with tiny dismount squads (7 or less bayonets say). They tend to die too quickly against tanks and other IFV if you put them out in the open and try to fight with them. The only useful IFV have decent protection IMHO - such as the Israeli models. And since the whole point of APC/IFV is the infantry they carry, then they have to carry a useful squad size too (8-10 dismounts).

IFV though are very nice to have if the enemy doesn't have too many, or high tech, MBT. And also has mainly APC mounted infantry. So South Africa with Ratel vs Cubans say. But if Cuba turns up with lots of the laser equipped model of the T55, it can be slaughter for the Ratels...

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

I have seldom used SP Arty for direct fire, but I have seen it in a few PBEM games - one of the first games I played (against Martinez) saw him attack with a 1944 Panzer KG using all kinds of stuff, incl Hummels, in the first wave.

Myself though I tend to keep the arty out of the danger zone as much as possible... :)

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

One of the reasons I've always liked the LVT/AAV (at least until they added thermal sights and the game cost skyrocketed), it's a perfectly good battle taxi and carries enough troops you only need 3 to carry even the "oversize" reinforced USMC Rifle Platoons (50+ troops).

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

On the arty issue for Ukraine, they do now or will shortly have modern counter battery/detection systems this also for now includes short range UAV's and let's not forget in many cases real time satellite data from the West. Refer to armyrecognition.com during Jan. (End of.)/Feb. (2-3 articles.) and this month I thought I saw one. Don't have access to my "rig" now so you're on your own, Happy Hunting!! If you know me, you know where I'm at this time of year!?! This is our 17th year in a row! It's "been verry verry good to" us as well.

Regards,
Pat

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

Reading this makes me feel like we're returning to WW1 style warfare again (at least concerning equal "tier" opponents...)

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

There are still a lot of Springfield 03's and Mauser 98's around, not to mention a few air forces still use P-51's as their main fighter.

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

Referring to the incident at Zyelenpilye, apparently ukrainian units cought there were battalion sized battlegroup from 79th Airborne Brigade and a battalion detached from the 24th Mechanized Brigade. Both units were reportedly cought in the open by the Grad barrage, losing (in 3 minutes!) 35 dead, 93 wounded, 30 combat vehicles including tanks, ifv's and apc's.
Word of warning about question of units size during ukraninian conflict - official designations should be treated as rather misleading. Usually units operated not fully completed, understrenght both in terms of manpower and equipment.
Generally lessons from war in Ukraina can be boiled down to few things:
1 Artillery, augmented with uav's recon (Russians/separatists reportedly had used more than 10 types of uav's) IS THE KING of battlefield. Especially rocket artillery using thermobaric and cluster ammunition. Static defenses were useless against concentrated barrages, APC's and older IFV's (BMP1/2) were not protected enough against submunitions and even shrapnels, even tanks were vulnerable. Units cought under barrages were suffering loses causing the combat-incapable.
I can find some precise data, but reaction times of russian regular rocket artillery units were apparently shocking to american observers.
2 Tank are practically impervious to infantry light AT weaponry. Even DC warheads don't guarantee an effective attack. Top-attack is the way to go, but with proliferation of active defense systems, it will be rendered ineffective too. The best way to destroy a tank is to use an another tank. But when Russian used their T-72B3's and T-90's (the latter in a very limited way) they proved superior to ukrainian T-64/T-64BM Bulats. From reports it looks that russian passive defense systems on tanks rendered all ukrainian ATGM arsenal ineffective.
3 UAV's (especially smaller ones) are surprisingly resistant to the AA fire. Ukrainians usually were engaging russian uav's using 14,5mm, 23mm and 30mm autocannons with very little success. MANPADS and SAM's are also not very effective due to uav's low radar and ir signature. On the other side, Russians very effectively used electronic warfare (GPS spoofing or jamming and other means) against few ukrainian uav's being used (sometimes these were simple commercial uav's fitted with cameras).

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

Artillery has been the bane of infantry in the open since the invention of the airburst. But as has been seen time and again it's fairly useless vs well entrenched ones.

Might be the Russians weren't so dumb after all keeping anti-tank guns!

Yeah, the ability of WinSPMBT to blow UAVs out of the air has long been something of an issue for me. I really think size 0 observation aircraft units shouldn't draw MANPADs. But at least the code was changed so they no longer get blasted by Area SAMs.

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

Another thing that I find impressive is the effectiveness of large caliber artillery in knocking out armored vehicles, even modern MBTs, using HE rounds. That is something almost impossible to do in the game though.

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

Strange, as one of my standard anti-tank tactics is to dump arty on any irritating tigers (ww2) and on through modern times. Even 25 pounders do fine as long as you remember that artillery is best used concentrated.

So if a target is worth attacking, you direct fire-blows onto one target at a time with all (or most) of your field and heavy batteries. That includes 4.2in/120mm mortars.

"One target" means directed into one spot - with a spread of maybe 3-4 hexes max from the centre point.

It may only "blow their socks off" - but any de-tracked AFV stuck in the wrong place are likely to be irrelevant to the game, and can be finished off with tank-hunter parties in the mop-up phase if necessary. Or they may simply get demoralised and the crew bail, so all you then need do is park a little scout car in the same hex for a turn to ensure it burns = full VP for it, and possibly a kill marker for the little scout car if it spots the debussed crew returning and brasses them up as it does this. And tin-can APC have always suffered when subjected to concentrated artillery fires.

Therefore - nothing in the article is really surprising. UK artillery has after all been in the swift concentrations of fire business since c. 1942 (Uncle, Mike, Yoke etc. fire orders - concentrations of fire from regiment all the way up to Army Group Artillery level).

As for UAVs in the game - these are really just spotter plane replacements. Your "Player God" level of battlefield knowledge of the enemy gives you "UAV level" spotting, even in 1930...

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

I know what you mean and I also use arty this way (if anything the fact that it separates enemy tanks from their supporting infantry, the suppression and the potential mobility kill all worth it). I mean arty used the way the author of the article says ie 122mm SPGs knocking the turret off T64s in direct fire (in game terms that would mean that the target is destroyed I guess, no?). I have never ever knocked out that kind of target with a frontal turret hit firing in direct mode.

I do agree with what you say about the UAVs, the player already has TOO much of battlefield awareness as it is.

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

The upcoming reduction in smoke given off by unspotted artillery/mortars will help this a bit.

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

I dont see anything unexpected in this at all, Russian units are now more flexible but still tend to stick to the plan. Decent Russian equipment is just that we should stop underestimating it like we have done for the last 40 years or so, ERA works ATGM counter measures work.
They have ECM capabilities & there battlefield awareness is getting there.
The Russians have known what artillery is capable of since forever basically & now using the TOS system with thermobaric warheads being dug in is far less helpful to survival. If the heat doesn't get you the lack of air to breath probably will.
Seems to me everything they were bad at they now do better, sometimes with the Wests help. We cant compete on the TI front so lets buy the stuff & no doubt reverse engineer it to see where we are going wrong.
Luckily your probably looking at only a percentage of their forces being well trained & equipped, that's a big pool to pull your best guys from & give the good stuff to.
So going back to WW1 & the disregard for human life the rest are cannon fodder to deplete stores.
If they ever went up against the USA I would send the canon fodder in first & let them use all the expensive ATGMs etc against them then send in the good guys not the other way round due to their overkill approach.

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

I believe a Royal artillery maxim is "Hit it, don't tap it."

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

There're two quotes from Heinz Guderian himself, about concentration of forces (although not about artillery per se):
Nicht Kleckern sondern Klotzen! (Boot 'em, don't spatter 'em!)
Man schlägt jemanden mit der Faust und nicht mit gespreizten Fingern. (You hit somebody with your fist and not with your fingers spread.)

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

In the game, I have used IFVs: Bradleys and LAV's with success due to the short range of Inf-ATMs, thereby allowing the 25mm cannon on the IFV to hit Inf-ATMs with impunity.

This is true in Soviet era and updated Russian BTG tactics with the use of organic MLRS and FA guns laying down concentrated "fire strikes" in front of advancing mechanized forces.

This works in the game as well. See Pyro's discussion on artillery supporting advancing infantry.
<br>

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

My comments taken from, "Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukranian War - Personal Observation," Phillip Karber, 2015 July 8.

Dr. Phillip Karber is an internationally recognized expert in defense and national security matters as president of the Potomac Foundation; an accomplished business executive; and a university professor at Georgetown according to his Linkin account.

By whatever name: New Generation Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, or Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), we would be remiss to discount the veracity to which Russia has committed her doctrine in Georgia, Ukraine, and the Baltic states; where we are seeing Russia lay the groundwork of her strategy as she did in Georgia and continues in the Ukraine upon the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to harass, isolate, and cede territory "by any means necessary."

Wargaming scenarios in our game based on Russian tactics in Ukraine illustrates the use of militia and special forces, heavy rocket and artillery fires, and a concentration of heavy armor and IFV's in maneuver formations.

The use of UAVs in targeting for "fire strikes," and reconnaissance. The ratio of MLRS to FA increased to 3 rocket platforms to every four FA guns. The extensive use of SP Artillery pieces in direct fire roles attached not at regimental but at the battalion level. In particular, the absence of javelin and TOWIIs on the Ukranian side begs the question on the MBT as king of the battlefield.

Interestingly, Russian MLRS and FA guns attached to maneuver battalions in no small part is a significant substitute for dismounted infantry advancing ahead of armor. This allows the maneuver battalions to maintain speed towards the objective; Furthermore, the tank gun maybe used to deliver direct fires as well as the tank's machine guns suppressing if not obliterating Inf-ATM teams.

The mechanized maneuver formations (BTGs) closely resemble McMaster's Eagle troop where Bradley's outfitted with TOWs accompanied Abrams into the fight at 73 easting as Russia similarly used mechanized forces during her recent Zapad-2017 war games in Belarus. Now, with the Russians pairing T-14s and T-15s sometime around 2021, such formations would present a formitable foe for NATO forces in the Baltics, especially with attached SP-Artillery and MLRS batteries.

Finally, Karber offers several battles from the Georgian war that maybe built as WinSpMBT scenarios; either from the Russian or Ukranian side.

<br>

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

Assuming you have an infantry screen, or for some reason can see the AT units, yes, but in most situations when you're going from A to B your first indication AT weapons are present is one of your APC/IFVs blowing up.

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

Read my post completely. Specifically, laying down artillery fires in front of advancing mech formations.

You should not advance more than 3 - 7 hexes a turn after an artillery barrage. With each end of and begining of turn have the leading elements scan ahead of the formation.

Lay your fires one after another on each sucessive turn in front of your mech formation. See Pyros' tutorial.

Additionally, each turn run UAV spotting runs.

An Inf-ATM may get off a shot, but it will be errant due to suppressive effects of the "fire strikes." Once exposed, he will die or tun tail and run following tank gun, auto canon, and arillery reaction fires.

Keep your logistics train close to keep the MLRS and FA guns loaded.

Possible con is the potential for artillery overload.
<br>

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

All well and fine if you have virtually unlimited artillery and/or ammo and opposition AA is relatively ineffective (or you have a LOT of UAVs).

I was thinking mostly about average situations.

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

False; Ammo not unlimited.

True; AA not a credible threat in Ukraine nor on an asymmetric battlefield, need only one UAV or possibly two, where the BCT element may have organic UAV with bridgate supplying an additional one. UAVs are ubiquitous on today's battlefield. However, Aeraaa's point, in an earlier post, about the player having too much awareness addresses this issue directly.

Not sure what you mean by "...average situations."

What is salient is the laying down of artillery fires in front of the mechanized force so as to maintain speed and tempo, that an infantry screen could not keep pace.

<br>

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

Most times artillery ammo is not sufficient to lay down a rolling barrage for the last couple km prior to contact with the expected opposition main line of resistance.

Artillery in generally used where you know, or VERY strongly suspect the the opposition is. That usually means you've spotted them with scouts/UAVs or taken fire from a position.

Now something like a pre-planned offensive you've spent months preparing for, sure, you've had time to stockpile trainloads of artillery ammo.

Re: Lessons Learned from the Rus - Ukr war
 

I've played some games with a force composed of a small unit of tanks/armored infantry and a ton of artillery. While seeing the fireworks is great fun, the truth is that you don't defeat the enemy quicker than a traditional larger force composed of more maneuver elements. Most of the game is, make slow gains with your scouts/advance guard, spot the enemy and send him into orbit with your arty/air force. It is a slow, methodical kind of battle and needs extra attention and planning. In addition to that, you REALLY have to be careful not to take many casualties, the force is too small to be effective after losing a significant number of men. In reality, modern armies are casualty averse, hence these kind of forces make sense. But in the game, I've enjoyed games with a larger force more.