[Pyros]

Before the attack began Batteries A and C, 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, were deployed at LZ FALCON.
These Batteries fired over 4,000 rounds of high-explosive ammunition during the night of 14/11 in close support of X-RAY.

To provide additional artillery support, Landing Zone COLUMBUS was established 4 1/2 kilometers to the northeast of X-RAY. This landing zone was midway between X-RAY and FALCON, where Batteries A and C of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, were located. Battery B of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, and Battery C of the 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery, were now moved into COLUMBUS.

The enemy broke contact and filtered back into the mountains after suffering tremendous losses. He was pursued with heavy firepower: cannon artillery continually pounded the area;

The division fired 40,464 artillery rounds and rockets during the campaign.

The artillerymen had learned much from this campaign. First, the concept of displacing and supplying artillery by air was proved valid, particularly in support of an airmobile force. During the campaign, artillery units of the cavalry division artillery had made a total of 79 tactical moves-67 of them by air. Continuous air movement by maneuver and support forces unsettled the enemy. Properly executed airmobile operations could keep constant pressure on him, wearing him down and destroying his will to resist. Second, aerial rocket artillery was shown to be extremely responsive and effective in augmenting cannon fires. Ground forces learned that aerial rocket artillery was reliable and extremely accurate, characteristics that were particularly important in close support missions. By controlling helicopter fires through artillery fire support channels, as was done with aerial rocket artillery, cannon and helicopter fires could be closely coordinated by a single individual, thus insuring that both were complementary. Third, artillerymen learned of the necessity of having artillery positions that were mutually supporting. Though Landing Zone COLUMBUS had stood off an enemy attack without mutually supporting artillery, its defenders had required air support, which in poor weather might not have been available. Fourth, because of the rugged terrain and dense foliage, target acquisition was a definite problem. Forward observers were still the best means of target acquisition because they were always with maneuver companies. To augment the forward observers, aerial observers were added whenever possible and were particularly effective in support of overland ground movements. Fifth, it was shown that the 105-mm. howitzer was a particularly good weapon for reconnaissance by fire. As the unit moved, the artillery forward observer would adjust artillery rounds in advance of the unit. This provided two benefits: the artillery could disrupt any activity or ambush site the enemy might have, and the location of the last round fired was a good indicator of the unit's location. This second advantage would allow for rapid delivery of artillery in the event the enemy ambushed the ground force.