[Charles M]

British and US artillery

Reading through the SPWW" Game Manual, in "Country Descriptions" readers will come across the comment that "American artillery was about the best in the world". The phrase is a little ambiguous, though the comments following it suggest that the writer is referring to equipment, rather than doctrine or effectiveness.

If the comment is meant to describe just US army equipment, this writer has no issues with it. However, if it is meant to refer to battlefield effectiveness based on doctrine as well as equipment it is well off the mark. If comparisons with British and US methods are made, the British win hands down. Indeed, the US army based their artillery doctrine and methods on British practice, but with important exceptions or, more accurately, omissions. A certain American museum curator featured in a TV documentary rather unwisely claimed that US artillery was the best in world war two, without doing his homework.

As described in my revised article on the British army as published in the ASL Annual, The British developed methods to quickly direct supporting artillery fire to where it was needed. From December 1942 the British put senior rather than just junior officers up front as well as observers in order to bring down the supportive fire of an entire army corps or larger formation if necessary, quickly and effectively. Although it demanded good radio communication, linking the various formations into the net, the regimental support of 24 guns could be answered in just 60 seconds (an 'Uncle' target), divisional support from 72 guns (a 'Mike' target) in 3-5 minutes, and corps level support in 8 minutes. The support of 150-250 guns ('Victor' target) was also possible, if little used, as was army level support ('William' target).

In the US army, the forward observers remained junior in rank, more akin to a 90-day wonder left alone with a radio. Lieutenant Colonel Paddy de Burgh, OBE from the Royal School of Artillery museum observed to this writer, "The two countries had different view points with the same end result, though we were quicker. We put our senior officers up front with the BC battery commander] working with the Battalion Commander and the two troop Commanders (Captains) and with the Companies. They made decisions on the spot and the appropriate fire orders went over the wireless. If, and only if, there was some other crisis only known to RHQ they could veto or adjust the guns available for the task.

The Americans put the young officers up front and therefore their fire orders were a request. The importance and allocation of guns was made at the gun end. Nevertheless if there was an emergency the request was acted on instantly".

This is why in certain scenarios in SPWW2 British artillery can bring down fire in the next turn (3 minutes' delay) rather than with greater delay.

Lt. Colonel de Burgh was at Arnhem with 17pdr AT guns and answered, over the years, many questions (posed when ASL was being researched) based on on his own experiences as an artillery officer throughout the war, working with a variety of weapons.

The other omission in US methods was more operational than doctrinal. Because the British in N.W. Europe adopted the narrow front approach, as opposed to the US army's 'broad front' strategy, British artillery had about twice as much ammunition available as US artillery units at any one time.

Sources


Ian Daglish, Battleground Europe -Normandy: Operation Bluecoat – The British Armoured Breakout, Barnsley, 2003, p. 176.
Russel A. Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Allies won in Normandy, London, 2003, pp. 90, 108 footnote 80, and 310.
Ian V. Hogg, The Guns: 1939-1945, London, 1969, p. 44.
Brigadier A.L. Pemberton, The Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, HMSO, 1950, p. 161.
Royal School of Artillery, letter from Lt. Colonel Paddy de Burgh, OBE, dated 25th July 1988.
Russel F. Weigly, Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944-1945, London 1981 edn., p 428 (general comment).