Excellent article on Afghanistan

[Snipey]

The didn't supply the Afghanistan contingent properly. Yes, there were supplies, but it wasn't enough. My quote was that the Stavka failed to supply the escalation. Your counter-argument is that "they did supply the limited contingent". Your counter-argument fails to address my argument.

Of course they had a hard time, this is war. Rarely do you see a war that's easy. The US war against the Iraqi Insurgency is no Operation Cakewalk.

I brought up Leningrad for a comparison to show what the Red Army could do. I didn't bring it up to start a debate over it. We both agreed that 640,000 civilians were supplied from scratch via a treacherous road.

In the Siege of Leningrad there was limited supply that the Soviets could give to the city, because, uhhh geez, I don't know, maybe the Great Patriotic War was still going on? When the Red Army fought against Afghanistan the USSR had no other wars. In the Vietnam War, the US had over 550,000 men in Vietnam. Why couldn't the Red Army do something similar? It took the Red Army under three months to bring over one million men, all the way across the USSR to help take out the Japanese Army in Manchuria and capture 600,000 POWs, and destroy the previously undefeated Japanese Army in a matter of weeks.

The Western Front was far more criticial then an actual war? Are you serious? After Hungary, and especially after Czeckoslovakia, it was pretty damn obvious that NATO was going to invade the USSR. On the other hand, after the Berlin Airlift and the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was obvious that USSR wasn't going to go after NATO. The War in Afghanistan started in 1979. The Western Front wasn't going to be an issue. Carter wasn't going to invade. Reagan's new program focused on providing a counter to USSR nukes, and then using US nukes to threaten USSR to give their natural resources to the West. Bush followed Reagan's foreign policy until the USSR collapsed. No ground invasion was even possible here. The front was idle, not because both sides balanced each other out, but because of the strategies employed by the USSR and NATO. Major powers tried to avoid going to war after World War II, for some strange reason, maybe total devastation of the agressor had something to do with that.

So according to your logic, you keep your best troops in an idle front, while you have your average troops fight an actual war. Gorbachev and Brezhnev both supported that logic and that's how you lose wars. On the other hand, the Red Army leadership opposed it fiercely. If you have an actual war and an idle front, you send your best troops to fight in the actual war. That's how you win wars. But now I see why you agree with Brezhnev and Gorbachev.

You think there were enough ambushes. I think more could have been set. It's a difference of opinion on what's enough.

I still don't see why the Red Army couldn't switch support from an unpopular leader to a popular one. On the local level (city, neighborhood, town) the USSR actually had honest elections. Could have done the same for Afghani tribes.

If tanks no work, get better tank. Have tanks with less wear and tear, and raise the main armament. The T-34 was a product of World War II. Surely if the Soviet effort was placed towards the War, something like the T-34 could have been done. If tanks aren't useful, you make them useful. The T-34's predecessor sucked. But the T-34 model that was used at Kursk, albeit with more casualties, was able to stop the Wehrmacht tanks in a tank v. tank battle for the first time.

You still failed to address my point about using third world country militaries, in the manner that I've described, that is SpetzNatz training, fight a year in Afghanistan. You also failed to address my point of giving the local Afghani forces that were pro-USSR more responsibility.

Find you a war where the army performed at 100%? US in the Persian Gulf War. Red Army from post-Stalingrad to pre-Berlin campaign. Ike's forces at Battle of Normandy. Suvorov's campaign in the late 1700's, early 1800's.

But you and I think differently. I think in the pure military mindset; I'm against the best resources in idle fronts when actual wars are being fought.

[Wdll]

The best thing about the T-34 was that for every german panzer, the USSR could field 1.5 billion T-34s. (yes I am kidding about the numbers).

After Hungary, and especially after Czeckoslovakia, it was pretty damn obvious that NATO was going to invade the USSR.

What are you drinking and where can I get some? How was NATO ever going to invade and with what?

Now, as for the rest of your post, I am ok more or less, but the above is a bit silly.

I agree that it was mainly a matter of leadership that cost the war to the soviets. They were just too civilized about it.

NATO today doesn't seem to be as confused, they kill civilians just fine, but the problem is that while the armed forces there have been trained to kill and destroy, they ask them to do police duties and, at least on the ground, be extra careful to whom the fire, since they want to earn the hearts and minds of the populace, which is where, unless there is some huge change somewhere, will be their undoing. You do not act civilized against an enemy that will gladly slaughter you and your family in a sec if they are given the chance.
I have to say, Alexander did the smart thing. Go in, make allies and whoever doesn't agree, destroy, burn, kill. Then let them keep peace on their own and get the fudge out of there.

[Snipey]

Originally Posted by Wdll

The best thing about the T-34 was that for every german panzer, the USSR could field 1.5 billion T-34s. (yes I am kidding about the numbers).

What are you drinking and where can I get some? How was NATO ever going to invade and with what?

Now, as for the rest of your post, I am ok more or less, but the above is a bit silly.

I agree that it was mainly a matter of leadership that cost the war to the soviets. They were just too civilized about it.

At least I made the comment about the Front being idle, so that might have clued people on. But that is a horrible mistake to make. I can't enough for that mistake

NATO today doesn't seem to be as confused, they kill civilians just fine, but the problem is that while the armed forces there have been trained to kill and destroy, they ask them to do police duties and, at least on the ground, be extra careful to whom the fire, since they want to earn the hearts and minds of the populace, which is where, unless there is some huge change somewhere, will be their undoing. You do not act civilized against an enemy that will gladly slaughter you and your family in a sec if they are given the chance.
I have to say, Alexander did the smart thing. Go in, make allies and whoever doesn't agree, destroy, burn, kill. Then let them keep peace on their own and get the fudge out of there.

Wow. That was retarded. I meant to say "It was pretty damn obvious that NATO wasn't going to invade the USSR". Thank you for catching that. If you read the context of the post, you'd pick it up. But I meant to say wasn't, gah! I just pulled a McLellan.

[Snipey]

In my defense, I did say that the front was idle, which meant no one was going to attack. But...just thank you for catching that, I cannot enough for that error.

[Snipey]

Oh wow, I'm on a roll! I accidentally inserted this "At least I made the comment about the Front being idle, so that might have clued people on. But that is a horrible mistake to make. I can't enough for that mistake " into Wdll's post. Sorry about that. Anyways, not to detract from all those posts, I'll repost my argument, as it should have been written, with the "wasn't". I just put too much thought into my previous reply, reposted here, and it took away from my thinking abilities for the rest of the day. And now I took a nap, so here goes:


The didn't supply the Afghanistan contingent properly. Yes, there were supplies, but it wasn't enough. My quote was that the Stavka failed to supply the escalation. Your counter-argument is that "they did supply the limited contingent". Your counter-argument fails to address my argument.

Of course they had a hard time, this is war. Rarely do you see a war that's easy. The US war against the Iraqi Insurgency is no Operation Cakewalk.

I brought up Leningrad for a comparison to show what the Red Army could do. I didn't bring it up to start a debate over it. We both agreed that 640,000 civilians were supplied from scratch via a treacherous road.

In the Siege of Leningrad there was limited supply that the Soviets could give to the city, because, uhhh geez, I don't know, maybe the Great Patriotic War was still going on? When the Red Army fought against Afghanistan the USSR had no other wars. In the Vietnam War, the US had over 550,000 men in Vietnam. Why couldn't the Red Army do something similar? It took the Red Army under three months to bring over one million men, all the way across the USSR to help take out the Japanese Army in Manchuria and capture 600,000 POWs, and destroy the previously undefeated Japanese Army in a matter of weeks.

The Western Front was far more criticial then an actual war? Are you serious? After Hungary, and especially after Czeckoslovakia, it was pretty damn obvious that NATO wasn't going to invade the USSR. On the other hand, after the Berlin Airlift and the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was obvious that USSR wasn't going to go after NATO. The War in Afghanistan started in 1979. The Western Front wasn't going to be an issue. Carter wasn't going to invade. Reagan's new program focused on providing a counter to USSR nukes, and then using US nukes to threaten USSR to give their natural resources to the West. Bush followed Reagan's foreign policy until the USSR collapsed. No ground invasion was even possible here. The front was idle, not because both sides balanced each other out, but because of the strategies employed by the USSR and NATO. Major powers tried to avoid going to war after World War II, for some strange reason, maybe total devastation of the agressor had something to do with that.

So according to your logic, you keep your best troops in an idle front, while you have your average troops fight an actual war. Gorbachev and Brezhnev both supported that logic and that's how you lose wars. On the other hand, the Red Army leadership opposed it fiercely. If you have an actual war and an idle front, you send your best troops to fight in the actual war. That's how you win wars. But now I see why you agree with Brezhnev and Gorbachev.

You think there were enough ambushes. I think more could have been set. It's a difference of opinion on what's enough.

I still don't see why the Red Army couldn't switch support from an unpopular leader to a popular one. On the local level (city, neighborhood, town) the USSR actually had honest elections. Could have done the same for Afghani tribes.

If tanks no work, get better tank. Have tanks with less wear and tear, and raise the main armament. The T-34 was a product of World War II. Surely if the Soviet effort was placed towards the War, something like the T-34 could have been done. If tanks aren't useful, you make them useful. The T-34's predecessor sucked. But the T-34 model that was used at Kursk, albeit with more casualties, was able to stop the Wehrmacht tanks in a tank v. tank battle for the first time.

You still failed to address my point about using third world country militaries, in the manner that I've described, that is SpetzNatz training, fight a year in Afghanistan. You also failed to address my point of giving the local Afghani forces that were pro-USSR more responsibility.

Find you a war where the army performed at 100%? US in the Persian Gulf War. Red Army from post-Stalingrad to pre-Berlin campaign. Ike's forces at Battle of Normandy. Suvorov's campaign in the late 1700's, early 1800's.

But you and I think differently. I think in the pure military mindset; I'm against the best resources in idle fronts when actual wars are being fought.

[Marcello]

My quote was that the Stavka failed to supply the escalation. Your counter-argument is that "they did supply the limited contingent". Your counter-argument fails to address my argument.

I wrote

Note: they DID supply their limited contingent, they DID supply the DRA army and security forces AND they DID supply the afghan population under their control, Kabul included. They had to ship half million of tons of wheat for civilian consumption during a single year. There certainly was no mass starvation in Kabul, to the best of my knowledge.
HOWEVER every single source on the matter notes that they had a hard time doing all of this. Adding, say an half million of troops or a massive reconstruction program of the 40.000 km of roads in Afghanistan or similar massive efforts would have in all likelyhood broken the back of the logistical system, even as it was the Salang pass had to be run on a one way system for example.

They did not fail to supply the escalation. There was no escalation in part (not exclusively but in part) precisely because they knew if there had been one THEN there would have likely been supply issues. Please take note also of the fact that the limited contingent was not the only thing they had to worry about supply wise. The afghan population under their control had to be supplied too and so the afghan army.

Now let’s examine the cases you brought up

Why couldn't the Red Army do something similar? It took the Red Army under three months to bring over one million men, all the way across the USSR to help take out the Japanese Army in Manchuria and capture 600,000 POWs, and destroy the previously undefeated Japanese Army in a matter of weeks.

The Red Army enjoyed secure rear areas and line sof communications in that theater of operations. Had the transiberian railroad been crawling with japanese constantly blowing it up all the day then it would not have been so easy.

In the Vietnam War, the US had over 550,000 men in Vietnam.

Which raises two points:

First of all: it did not work, so why do the same?

Second: in Vietnam the americans had safe access to several sea ports along the coast (and Vietnam was mostly coast), their overland lines of communications were much shorter than soviet ones in Afghanistan and not as heavily harrassed.Close air support could be operated even from aircraft carriers off the coast which could be then resupplied elsewhere. Close air support in Afghanistan relied on planes that were based in the country and whose bombs/fuel had to be shipped by convoys which were constantly attacked.And so on.
Had there been, say an efficient submarine campaign against US shipping and more active Vietcong in the South then, again, it would not have been so easy

Are you serious?

Ever heard something about “Able Archer” or “operation Ryan”, if not Google is your friend. Yes afterwards it is pretty damn easy to say that “obviously” nothing was ever going to happen but the soviet leadership could not afford to play armchair strategist with hindsight benefit. There was little to gain in Afghanistan and a lot to lose elsewhere. If things turned hot the western theater forces needed everything at hand, it could not be magically teleported back from Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the Red Army leadership opposed it fiercely

I have never heard anything about the Red Army leadership specifically suggesting to gut (meaning, taking away the gunships,trucks and others items needed in the afghan theater) the western theater forces for Afghanistan sake.If you have any source on that, please provide it. Asking for more resources, well they did. Some asked for some additional troops or going after Pakistan but it questionable they had fully worked out the implications, these were the same dudes who initially believed the afghan army could handle the guerrillas by itself after all. Armies seldom feel they have enough of the cake. Problem was that the soviet cake was small.

I still don't see why the Red Army couldn't switch support from an unpopular leader to a popular one.

Simple: because said leader would tell soviets to go and screw themselves.If not he would cease being popular.
Afghani tribes hated the Kabul regime and hated the soviet troops. Communist ideology was fundamentally at odds with traditional afghan way of life. Foreign communist troops were doubly unwelcomed.
This was such a basic reality of the afghan war that your inability to grasp it is beginning to make me wonder if I am not just wasting my time.
Kabul tried to enlist religious figures in support for example. It was a total failure.

If tanks aren't useful, you make them useful.

Actually the logical thing is doing what they did: use something else which is more useful.

Have tanks with less wear and tear.

It does not work. Heavy tracked vehicles are inherently bad for roads and are inherently more maintenance intensive. It is a engineering reality. You might as well ask for tanks which run on cow dung.

You also failed to address my point of giving the local Afghani forces that were pro-USSR more responsibility.

No simply the previous post was getting long winded so I wrote

I could go on on the other points if you are interested but really, the 90% of the things you are touting as solutions or that you seem to think were never done fall into three categories:

1)They actually were the standard tactical repertoire.
2)They were tried and did not work.
3)They were obviously unworkable.

But I see that you are not convinced so let's examine it.
Giving the local Afghani forces more responsability is exactly what they wanted to do. The idea was that the soviet forces would provide support and the afghans would have most of the responsibility for actual operations. It did not work so the soviets were forced to undertake combat operations by themselves. Nobody wanted to fight for the USSR sake. When the soviets finally leaved THEN the DRA security forces started to put on a decent performance.

You still failed to address my point about using third world country militaries, in the manner that I've described, that is SpetzNatz training, fight a year in Afghanistan.

That’s why I wrote:

The remaining 10% may or may not have worked but were not enough to make a difference.

So they get a few additional battalions of Spetnaz.Big deal. Note they would still have to deploy helicopters gunships and logistical support for them.
Really they tried nearly all of the things you have suggested so far, plus some you probably don't even know about. Bribing militias? Check. Bombers based off country? Check. Shooting SCUDs at insurgents strongholds (OK more an afghan army thing actually)? Yep that was done too.

US in the Persian Gulf War

Really? I take you never heard all the polemics about the army failing to encircle the republican guard divisions for example?

[Marcello]

In the Siege of Leningrad there was limited supply that the Soviets could give to the city, because, uhhh geez, I don't know, maybe the Great Patriotic War was still going on?

You made a pretty clear statement to support your point (and not an unimportant one) which was factually wrong. If you cannot admit to be wrong and prefer backtracking and pretending to have said something else, then sorry I have no interest going further and I will cut it here.

[Snipey]

Originally Posted by Marcello

You made a pretty clear statement to support your point (and not an unimportant one) which was factually wrong. If you cannot admit to be wrong and prefer backtracking and pretending to have said something else, then sorry I have no interest going further and I will cut it here.

I have no wish to go further, because this isn't about the Siege of Leningrad. You want to go off-topic, I don't. As you can see from the previous 3 posts, I admit my mistakes and I can easily counter your claim, but this from is for wars from 1946 until today. I already had several off-topic threads locked, because someone else went off-topic. Why is this so hard for you to understand?


Now, back on topic:

Once again, are you telling me that the USSR could not produce enough supplies and enough men to fight the Taliban? My point wasn't that the Stavka smoked weed 24/7. My point was that the Stavka did little to nothing to support the war. The fact that there was no escalation is a failure in itself. To claim that, if the Soviet Logistics system was devoted fully to the Afghani War, it was going to be broken over an escalation, contradicts reality. The USSR's production capacity was enough to defeat the Wehrmacht Armies, was enough to field and equip armies of millions of men. Here you are arguing that supplying half a million would have broken it's back. Really?

And if you are worried about the supply roads being attacked, why not set up ambushes at every single kilometer along the supply lines. Have more battles. Do what Grant did to the South. For every Soviet soldier that died, roughly 5 to 20 Mujaheedin died, (estimates vary). So keep on fighting. The Mujaheedin had 500,000 men at most. So you take the 100,000 casualties, and you win the war. The USSR could afford to take that many casualties.

If the Red Army was given time to set up proper supply roads, as the Red Army Doctrine dictated, instead of rushed to take Kabul, as politicians dictated, than the supply lines would not be a problem. During World War II, Chuikov wanted to rush to Berlin, but Zhukov cautioned against it. Had Chuikov's tactic been employed, the Red Army supply lines would not have been secured. The reason that the Red Army supply lines were secure in WWII is because the Red Army secured them! The same wasn't done in the Afghani War.

It didn't work in Vietnam because the troops weren't used properly. The troops were used for humping, often having to take the same peice of land over and over again, land that had no strategic value. The troops were often rotated, based on guesswork, rather than an actual strategy. The people, in both cases, were ignored, and that's a crucial mistake made by both, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the American in Vietnam. However, that mistake was made by the Stavka in case of Afghanistan, or the White House, in the case of Vietnam, not by the troops and their commanders.

Just read all about "Able Archer" and "Operation Ryan". Shouldn't it be "Operation RYAN"? Anyways, the premise of troops making a difference in the nuclear war between the USSR and US, in the 1980's is a delusion. If the US and USSR go to a nuclear war, the non-nuclear armed forces won't make the difference. Also, it delusional to think that the American or Soviet Citizens would be supportive of such an effort, or that the leaders, of both USSR and US were that much bat**** insane. There are other explanations, that are sane, such as Andropov trying to use fear to bring the Politburo under his command, or the US promoting the Military Industrial Complex. As for USSR and US going to nuclear war over exercises, or Reagan's plans that were in the developmental stages, I don't buy it.

The Red Army's initial plan of invading Afghanistan was to attack all along the Soviet-Afghan border, akin to what happened in Manchuria in 1945. The initial blitz would catch the Taliban off-guard and would enable the Red Army to unite with the Afghan Army, and the non-Pashtu tribes, placing a sizable chunk of Afghanistan under Soviet control, in the first few weeks of the war. It is similar to what the Americans did in Afghanistan in 2001-2003, until the Iraqi detour, and that campaign yeilded remarkable results, for the first breaking the Taliban. And then Bush the idiot went into Iraq and the Taliban rebuilt.

As for the Red Army leadership, they didn't specify which front the units would come from, but they repeatedly asked for more units, to stabilize the situation, to stop the unnecessary loss of men, requests that were repeatedly denied by the Stavka of Brezhnev and Gorbachev. Nor was the Red Army's cake small. They had over a million men in uniform, that's not small to me.

You can always relax the ideology. During WWII Red Army was all about freedom of religion. The fact that the ideology wasn't relaxed is yet another Stavka mistake, another moronic act of Brezhnev and Gorbachev.

More men always make a difference. A few additional battalions of SpetzNatz is a big deal. The few additional battalions of SpetzNatz made a huge difference in Chechnya. Nor do they need helicopters for support. They can be dropped as parachute units and they'll act on their own.

Nor were enough Soviet Innovations geared towards the Afghani War. During WWII there were massive Soviet Innovations, the AK, the T-34, the Katuysha, the... I could just keep on going and going. What were the innovations during the Afhgani War?

My point remains. The Stavka must have done more. Take a look at the Second Chechen War. You know the one that the Russians won. What's the difference between Chechnya and Afghanistan? Aside from Afghanistan being larger? In between the two Chechen Wars, Chechnya had a heavy indoctrination of Talibanism and Wahhabism. However the Russian Army, equipped with much less than the Red Army, won the Second Chechen War.

Initially it was 93,000 Russian and allied soldier, vs. 22,000 Chechen insurgents. These men weren't as good as the Red Army troops, so the ratio was 1 to 3. The Russians went in, not afraid of the deaths, and after taking out 14,000 out of 22,000 - won the war. Sure they lost roughly 5,000 but the war was won. If your troops are constantly being killed, your leaders liquidated by a few battalions of SpetzNatz, you lose morale. So it was 93,000 vs. 22,000, but for simpler math, let's say 4 to 1. In Afghanistan it was 1 to 2. See the difference?

Not to mention in the Second Chechen War there were new military tools used. The T-90 sent the Chechens into panic. New fire teams did their jobs. New tactics were applied.

In short, if Russia could win in Chechnya, which they did, USSR could have won in Afghanistan.

[Marcello]

Once again, are you telling me that the USSR could not produce enough supplies and enough men to fight the Taliban?

Taliban? in the 80's?

To claim that, if the Soviet Logistics system was devoted fully to the Afghani War, it was going to be broken over an escalation, contradicts reality.

Transportation bottleneck. I will spell it in more clear terms: traffic jam. But I guess you will just tell me: build more roads...

If the Red Army was given time to set up proper supply roads, as the Red Army Doctrine dictated, instead of rushed to take Kabul, as politicians dictated, than the supply lines would not be a problem.

The idea was doing a replay of previous interventions in the Warsaw Pact.That required speed and surprise, not slow methodical occupation.Initial objectives were accomplished. Too bad Afghanistan was not Hungary or Czechoslovakia...

the leaders, of both USSR and US were that much bat**** insane

Fear and "better safe than sorry".

If the US and USSR go to a nuclear war, the non-nuclear armed forces won't make the difference.

Which begs the one million dollars question: why were massive conventional forces mantained in first place throught the entire Cold War? Why was NATO boosting conventional forces in the 80's?

The initial blitz would catch the Taliban off-guard and would enable the Red Army to unite with the Afghan Army,

Taliban in 1979? Again
And they did unite with the Afghan Army. Just the Afghan did not want to be united with their soviet brothers...

You know the one that the Russians won. What's the difference between Chechnya and Afghanistan? Aside from Afghanistan being larger?

A lot larger. And a lot more populated. And with an other superpower funneling aid through safe havens...

The T-90 sent the Chechens into panic.

Uh? T-90s were deployed in the Far East according to all sources I have seen.And even if some were sent there for some limited combat testing, Chechens into panic for that?

Any source for that?

And with this I have finished.It has been interesting and you have interesting views.Thank you very much.

[Snipey]

Well it had been a fun debate Now my response:

I meant Mujaheedin, not Taliban. Although the Mujaheedin and the Taliban have similar organizational structure, they share similar commanders, have similar fighting tactics, although the Taliban's are a bit more advanced.

More roads do prevent traffic jams. Someone tell that to out Gubernator!

The initial objectives in Afghanistan were not accomplished. Had the Red Army Plan been followed, instead of Brezhnev's Plan, they would've been accomplished, but they weren't accomplished. In Hungary the rebels were knocked out instantly. In Czeckoslovakia, it was a different case altogether, please don't link the two, Hungary was very, very different from Czeckoslovakia. Hungary was a NATO sponsored, CIA ran rebel movement. Czeckoslovakia was an actual attempt at democratic change, and a Soviet Intervention. The rebels in Czeckoslovakia were a response to the Soviet Intervention, whereas in Hungary they preceded Soviet Intervention.

NATO/US wanted to use the Imperialist Model. Look at Serbia. Look at Iraq. What kind of forces are in Iraq? Where's the justification for Iraq? Conventional forces were also needed to defend the nation. I mean, even in an economic crisis the US wouldn't cut back on its conventional navy, because neither Mexico nor Canada pose a threat to the US, and the US Navy, being the best in the World, prevent any other points of invasion.

I agree that conventional force on a massive scale is overrated, but parts of these massive armies should be maintained for self-defense. Or, for instance, if the US and China fight over Taiwan, that war will not be nuclear. India's war with China over Tibet was conventional. I agree that conventional forces didn't need to be so damn big, for both sides, but smaller conventional forces were necessary. They also conventional forces that fought in Afghanistan.

You're telling me no one funneled aid to Chechnya? Granted, it was done discreetly and professionally, but the Russian Army was finding interesting things on dead Chechen bodies, of equiptment that couldn't have possibly been made in Chechnya. And I've agreed that Afghanistan is a lot larger and a lot more populated. Hence I said: use a force that's a lot bigger.

Ahh, the T-90s. In order to understand that, you have to read the Moscow Defense Brief, and realize that the Second Chechen War had a trigger. That trigger was the Chechen Invasion of Dagestan. The Moscow Defense Brief confirms the use of the T-90 in the Dagestan War, where Russia fought Chechnya for the control of Dagestan.

"The use of T-90S tanks in Dagestan deserves mention. A group of these vehicles consisting of 8 to 12 units according to different sources was supposed to be delivered to India. Folªlowing a sharp aggravation of the situation in the Caucaªsus, however, the tanks were transferred to Dagestan. In the Kadari zone one T-90 was hit by seven RPG anti-tank rockets but remained in action. This indicates that with regular equipªment T-90S is the best protected Russian tank, especially if Shtora and Arena defensive protection systems are integrated in it." http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2002/ac/raowdsmcc/