Excellent article on Afghanistan

[Anthony_Scott]

Originally Posted by Wdll

Isn't that Keegan's book the one where he tries to look good by bashing Clausewitz?

No, the book central theme is trying to view warfare through the Clausewitz view that warfare is a continuation of official state political policy through another means. Clausewitz understood that politics always motivated warfare.

I have bookmarked the links that were provided and will read them later.The Soviet war in Afghanistan is a virtual unknown and the more that I can learn about it the more I can enlighten my colleagues about it.

[Anthony_Scott]

Michael Yon is currently in Afghanistan and is stomping about with British soldiers. He has posted this article along with excellent photos. Also, the Yon article has some excellent Google Earth screenies that might prove valuable for scenario design.

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/bad-medicine.htm

Also, I have come across an article detailing why training the ANA is taking so long. I especially like the latter part of the article where he goes a long way to demolish, in his view, many of the assumptions people have about the ANA.

http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/a...24.html#006507

Lastly, a big thank you to those of you who have posted civil and professional answers to this post. I have learned alot from the answers and hope that further articles I post will start many more robust learning sessions. We are here to learn.

[Snipey]

Originally Posted by redcoat2

Without wishing to be drawn into the debate I would just like to post a couple of links to articles about the Soviet-Afghan War.

The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains
by Lester W. Grau, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/doc...redinmount.htm

Humping a Ruck Across Sunny Afghanistan, Summer of 1986.
A Snipers Paradise interview with a Soviet Spetsnaz vet of the Soviet-Afghan War.

http://www.snipersparadise.com/articles/soviet.htm

The last article is truly a must read. Thank you Also, I remember someone here talking about Soviets not having NCOs, or something like that: "Andrei: Typically 22 people or somewhere around there. There were five officers, 4 NCO's, and the rest sergeants and privates. "

[redcoat2]

Originally Posted by Anthony_Scott

Michael Yon is currently in Afghanistan and is stomping about with British soldiers. He has posted this article along with excellent photos. Also, the Yon article has some excellent Google Earth screenies that might prove valuable for scenario design.

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/bad-medicine.htm

Thanks. Interesting article and photos.

[Marcello]

Originally Posted by Snipey

The volunteer quote comes from a Russian movie about the Afghanistan War. Also, I'd like to point out that even if said movie is incorrect, the Red Army never had more than 10 percent in Afghanistan. One out of ten volunteering for glory, for a better wage, for excitement, for heroics, it's not that far fetched.

Movies are entertainment and simply cannot be trusted as history sources. Else one could be led to assume that King Tigers look exactly like M47s...

Now I am certainly not an expert about the Soviet/Russian army (I am more interested in their clients) but every source I read
about them describe the 80's era Soviet Army as a conscript Army,
no Kontraktniki back them. You were called up and you showed up and were sent where the higher ups saw fit, which might be Afghanistan. You could volunteer for Spetnaz/VDV duty which might again land you in Afghanistan.
At no point I have ever found mention of ad hoc volunteer units raised for Afghan duty or any other mechanism that would ensure that the bulk (as opposed to some individuals) of the units posted there were manned with volunteers specifically wishing to be there.
I imagine that some officers and soldiers might have requested to go there and perhaps such requests might have been accepted but there is no mention of such a thing being widespread anywhere. Hence I would like to see something on it, if there is any.

Originally Posted by Snipey

In other words, it wasn't the devastating losses that made the Red Army withdraw from Afghanistan, and the Red Army could have kept on going. The major problem, the reason why the Red Army lost in Afghanistan, was the Brezhnev-Gorbachev Government. But to Americans, who are crazy about "Gorby Mania" this is hard to understand. The main problem is that Gorbachev was a disaster for the USSR, but only Gorbachev's "sunny side" was shown in the American Press, his treatment of the Red Armed Forces, of the USSR's farmers, of factory workers, of, well pretty much the common man, was rather poor.

The soviets got out because while they were not suffering devastating losses they were still suffering losses and using up resources while accomplishing nothing of substance.
As it turned out the DRA security forces were able to hold the line by themselves and the soviets could not do much more than that when they were around anyway.

In regards to Gorbachev, yes in hindsight it was a disaster.
But it was apparent by the early 80's that the system in its current form was going nowhere. Absent changes they would simply be overtaken by the West, with their economy, conventional forces etc. lagging further and further behind. Perhaps they might have managed to shield themselves indefinitively behind the nuclear arsenal and be content with running a stagnating and increasingly less relevant country. Not a pleasant thought unless you are of the Kim Jong-il ilk.
Do you think the rest of the soviet establishment would have let Gorbachev go as far as he did otherwise?

[Anthony_Scott]

Originally Posted by Snipey

[QUOTE
The last article is truly a must read. Thank you Also, I remember someone here talking about Soviets not having NCOs, or something like that: "Andrei: Typically 22 people or somewhere around there. There were five officers, 4 NCO's, and the rest sergeants and privates. "

I am referring to the lack of long-service NCO's like we have in the West. Those men tend to be the backbone of a long-service army and RussianSoviet military doctrine of the time put many of the duties associated with low- to mid-ranking corporals and sgts into the hands of very junior lieutenant ranks. To my knowledge that practice has not changed.

[Mobhack]

Originally Posted by Anthony_Scott

I am referring to the lack of long-service NCO's like we have in the West. Those men tend to be the backbone of a long-service army and RussianSoviet military doctrine of the time put many of the duties associated with low- to mid-ranking corporals and sgts into the hands of very junior lieutenant ranks. To my knowledge that practice has not changed.

In the early 1970's the Soviets reintroduced the praporshchik rank. Sort of an ensign or warrant officer. [Isby, weapons and tactics of the Soviet Army, p65]

Praporishchiki are trained in one-year courses and enjoy many of the privileges of officers ... have developed much of the aura of respect and competence of the Anglo-American warrant officer ...

Isby also mentions that there is also a route for NCO conscripts to remain in the army by enlisting for extended service, those not deemed quite good enough to become Praporishchiki remain as plain NCOs. However, only about 1-2% would extend after their 2 years conscript service. Most Russians would rather be out of the army!.

Isby gives 5% of the Soviet Army as being long-service NCOs. This is minuscule by comparison with Western armies, even those which bulked up their "other-ranks" volume with national service conscripts.

Also, Praporishchiki were often employed as e.g helicopter pilots, missile system operators or similar to-task specialists, rather than as line (e.g motor rifle) unit SNCOs. So the Soviets were not really using these as a "Backbone" to the army as Company(+) sergeant-majors etc.

Cheers
Andy

[Snipey]

The quote was from more of a documentary, than an actual movie type thing, I should have clarified that earlier. From what I gathered, the people were conscripted, and out of those conscripted some volunteered to go to Afghanistan. Also there were Spetznatz volunteers.

There are whole articles and multiple viewpoints as to what the Soviets accomplished/didn't accomplish in Afghanistan. I will say that under Soviet rule Afghan women's lives improved. However, this is bordering on politics, so I won't go any further in that direction.

I was talking about Gorbachev's mishandling the army, and the domestic front. I don't buy the argument that one has to sacrifice the army in order to achieve political goals. I do know that the army was going to coup Gorbachev eventually, because of the War in Afghanistan. Gorbachev either had to pull out the troops, or supply the troops. Instead he did nothing. The army isn't a pushover in Russia, they have power. The could've prevented Yeltsin from couping Gorbachev. But he lost their trust. If you choose to, pardon my French, **** your fellow countrymen for your political ambitions, then you aren't a great leader, and quite frankly, you are a poor exuse for a human being. Gorbachev truly screwed the Red Army, almost as bad as Stalin.

The USSR was already overtaken by the West. US had FDR, while USSR had Stalin. US had no war fought on its soil, except Pearl Harbor, Alaska and minor incidents. USSR took the brunt of the war. Being overtaken by the West was nothing new to the USSR. It wasn't like there was a point in time where the Soviets were winning the Cold War, with the exception of America's disastrous War in Vietnam, but that mistake was American, not Soviet.

However USSR could never have been isolated as North Korea is today? Having lived in Yeltsin's Russia, I can say that it wasn't worth it. Nothing was worth going through that. As for changes, I believe they would've happened, through this cool thing called a "series of tubes" aka The Internet. There was a war between the Russian Hackers and the Russian Government. The hackers won. With the exception of articles aiding Nazism, those aiding Al Qaeda, and those publishing explicit materials of child pornography, the Internet, in Russia, is uncensored. And quite frankly, I doubt that the Soviet Government could have defeated the Russian Hackers, because the Soviet Government failed to stop the importation of Rock and Roll, which I personally believe was a wonderful import. After the Internet was made available to the masses, the USSR Government would have to adopt, and free speech, would be allowed, except without the mass panic that was produced and that has killed, according to estimates, at least 3,000,000 to 5,000,000 Russians. To call it a disaster is a huge understatement.

[Marcello]

Originally Posted by Snipey

Gorbachev either had to pull out the troops, or supply the troops.

I don't understand what you mean by "supply" here. Trasportation was a bottleneck, with a poor road network used by harrassed convoys where one truck every 3-4 had to carry a Zu-23 instead of cargo for self defense. It is questionable they could have shipped there much more stuff than they actually did. I suppose they could have brought more high quality stuff, say more SU-25s instead of older planes, more PGMs etc but that was 1)expensive and they were already overspending in the military 2) the more modern stuff was badly needed by the GSFG in case the balloon went up, which around 1983 or so was not an extremely remote possibility.

Or do you have something else in mind?

Being overtaken by the West was nothing new to the USSR. It wasn't like there was a point in time where the Soviets were winning the Cold War, with the exception of America's disastrous War in Vietnam, but that mistake was American, not Soviet.

Perhaps being overtaken was the wrong choice of word. I will explain with an example: insofar such things can be gauged the soviet economy was still growing at competitive world rates in the 60's. It was believable back then that catching up with the developed world could have been possible at some point in the future.
By the 80's this was definitively not the case anymore.
Do you get what I am trying to say?

[Marcello]

On the above, I am not so sure on the escort/transport ratio.
I remembered it was written somewhere in this website
http://www.ruswar.com/army.htm
But it might be just my memory playing tricks. Still it did not look like a walk in the park: