A much better quality report is available here:
http://www.uscarbinecal30.com/forum/...topic4568.html
Basically by 1 JAN 1945, the following shipments had been sent out to the operational theatres:
ETO: 25 Snooperscopes and 25 Sniperscopes
CBI: 25 Snooperscopes and 25 Sniperscopes
POA: 335 Snooperscopes and 175 Sniperscopes
SPOA: 350 Snooperscopes and 150 Sniperscopes
SWPA: 50 Snooperscopes and 50 Sniperscopes
In the ETO they were kept for training purposes -- about 25 Sniperscopes were shipped to 5th Army in the first week of March 1945, for example.
In the Pacific, eventually we ended up with roughly this distribution:
The Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes were not provided to special sniper units. Decisions on how best to deploy the equipment, who would use it, and how they would use it was left to each battalion to decide based on their own experience.
Some units tried them on night-time patrols, some tried them during offensive actions. All quickly came to the same conclusion: the equipment was best suited for use with their night-time defensive perimeters, particularly when teamed up with or near machine gun or light machine gun positions.
...
On the night of 11 April, a snooperscope operator with a battalion of the 96th Division detected an infiltration attempt. One company reported 25 enemies killed, with another company reporting 16 more killed with machine-gun fire directed by another snooperscope operator in the emplacement.
On another night, a snooperscope operator with a unit of the 96th Division spotted an 8 man Japanese patrol attempting to infiltrate under cover of a sea wall. The 8 man team was wiped out by machine-gun fire directed by the snooperscope operator.
Another night when a Sniperscope operator detected a 4 man patrol attempting infiltration, communication with a nearby BAR emplacement directed fire effectively and eliminated the group.
Enemy casualties reported directly to Capt. Patterson, by the 7th and 96th Divisions for the period of 01 Apr to 16 Apr, was 150 enemy casualties directly and indirectly attributed to the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes. The actual number killed was estimated to be higher as the 150 represented only those confirmed. This represented a total of about 3% of the total enemy casualties credited to these two divisions during this time. This estimate did not indicate if the 3% included both daytime time and night time casualties. Also absent were the casualty assessments by the other Army Divisions or the USMC Divisions. The 3% estimate was 3% of the casualties inflicted by the 7th and 96th Divisions.
Later casualty claims by the media and authors have included 30% of the enemy casualties during the first week, 33% during the first two weeks, and 33% during the first three weeks. Those who cite a source for this information indicate an article authored by William Garstang, president of Electronic Labs, published in the April 1946 issue of the Electronic Labs employee newsletter The Electronic Beacon.
There's a lot more, that link is worth looking at.