Marcello brings up a good point. These are more about cause and effect then numbers, but I'll see what I can come up with.
I feel these would be of some use to you scenario and campaign folks as well. The first is
very detailed from Stephen Biddle a very well respected analyst. The second comes from the independent Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the U.S. Army. It's the study of the
Battle of 73 Easting JANUS simulation that took into account the individual actions of all enemy and friendly individual units actions etc.
as noted below from ref 1.
http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/victory.html
The (#) footnotes provide
very valuble information where indicated in the above ref.
"The
73 Easting Project is a collaborative study conducted jointly by the independent Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the U.S. Army. Its purpose was to develop a data base of unprecedented detail on the conduct of a single battle (the "Battle of 73 Easting"), then to use modern computer simulation technology to represent that data in a "virtual re-creation" of the minute-to-minute activities of each participating tank, armored vehicle, truck, or infantry team.(14) The resulting data provides an important resource in itself. But the unique strength of the 73 Easting analysis is the power that computer simulation provides to conduct controlled experiments by changing key characteristics of the historical event, then re-fighting the simulated battle and observing directly the effects on the putative outcome. This makes it possible to test alternative cause-and-effect hypotheses with especially thorough, systematic counterfactual analysis.(15)"
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...f&AD=ADA257266
At the end of the above ref. a table shows the Iraqi losses at 73Easting. Both the battle with unit make up.
These look at the reasons for the high Iraqi losses and the U.S. and allied lack there of. Later and newer analysis would later support many if not most of the conclusions drawn in the first ref. It is clear that Iraq did not learn the lessons from the "First Gulf War" in preparing for and while fighting the "Second Gulf War".
Regards,
Pat