Units used in the LZ_X-ray battle

[Pyros]

Captain Ed W. Freeman, United States Army, distinguished himself by numerous acts of conspicuous gallantry and extraordinary intrepidity on 14 November 1965 while serving with Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). As a flight leader and second in command of a 16-helicopter lift unit, he supported a heavily engaged American infantry battalion at Landing Zone X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley, Republic of Vietnam. The infantry unit was almost out of ammunition after taking some of the heaviest casualties of the war, fighting off a relentless attack from a highly motivated, heavily armed enemy force. When the infantry commander closed the helicopter landing zone due to intense direct enemy fire, Captain Freeman risked his own life by flying his unarmed helicopter through a gauntlet of enemy fire time after time, delivering critically needed ammunition, water, and medical supplies to the besieged battalion. His flights had a direct impact on the battle's outcome by providing the engaged units with timely supplies of ammunition critical to their survival, without which they would almost surely have experienced a much greater loss of life. After medical evacuation helicopters refused to fly into the area due to intense enemy fire, Captain Freeman flew 14 separate rescue missions, providing life-saving evacuation of an estimated 30 seriously wounded soldiers -- some of whom would not have survived had he not acted. All flights were made into a small emergency landing zone within 100 to 200 meters (2-4 hexes) of the defensive perimeter where heavily committed units were perilously holding off the attacking elements. Captain Freeman’s selfless acts of great valor, extraordinary perseverance, and intrepidity were far above and beyond the call of duty or mission and set a superb example of leadership and courage for all of his peers. Captain Freeman’s extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army.

228th ASHB was the 1st Cavalry Division's Chinook Battalion. The Bn had three companies of CH-47 aircraft. Each company had 16 "Hooks." The Battalion Headquarters (HHC) had a UH-1D/H "Slick" and one OH-6A "Loach." Guns-A-Go-Go was originally the 53rd Aviation Detachment and became the 1st Aviation Detachment when it was assigned to the
1st Cavalry Division in November 1966

[Pyros]

Preparatory phase
The aerial artillery came on the heels of the tube artillery fire and worked over the area for 30 seconds expending half their load, then went into a orbit nearby to be on call. The lift battalion gunships took up the fire and were immediately ahead of the troop transport Hueys.

Close Air Support by 7th air force's 1st commando
Strikes in support of ground operations in Ia Drang

740 CAS sorties were flown, mainly in support of LZ X Ray and Albany.
Air Force tactical air provided continuous support with a fighter bomber on a target run on an average of once every fifteen minutes;
- A-4 Skyhawks
- A-37 Dragonfly
- F-4 Phantoms
- A-1 Skyraider
- AC-47 "Dragonship"
- AC-119 "Stinger"
- AC-130 "Spectre"
- F-100 Super Sabre
- B-52 (Modified for conventional bombs)

[B-52 missions[/b]

Five B-52 missions with 96 sorties were flown.

The most devastating support was provided by B-52 bombers which struck without warning six kilometers west of X-RAY. Though the bombers had been employed initially in Vietnam some six months earlier, this was their first use in direct support of U.S. troops on a tactical operation. For the next five days, the big bombers systematically bombed large areas of the Chu Pong Massif.

Quantity of Air and Arty support in the final stage of the battle

Then, after his soldiers marked their units’ positions, he ordered strikes by over two dozen aircraft and called on the fires of four batteries of artillery.

ARA

It consisted of three firing batteries, each equipped with twelve Huey helicopters armed with 2.75-inch aerial rockets.

In his after action report, Colonel Moore noted that aerial rocket artillery had been extremely effective. His commanders had confidence in bringing such fires extremely close to their own positions. He also had noted that tube artillery, aerial rocket artillery, and tactical air can be used at the same time without seriously downgrading the effectiveness of the fire or endangering the aircraft. The aerial rocket artillery and Tactical Air flew perpendicular to the artillery gun-target line in those cases when they were making a simultaneous attack on the same target areas. This technique was possible by close teamwork between the forward air controller and the artillery liaison officer.

[Pyros]

Before the attack began Batteries A and C, 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, were deployed at LZ FALCON.
These Batteries fired over 4,000 rounds of high-explosive ammunition during the night of 14/11 in close support of X-RAY.

To provide additional artillery support, Landing Zone COLUMBUS was established 4 1/2 kilometers to the northeast of X-RAY. This landing zone was midway between X-RAY and FALCON, where Batteries A and C of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, were located. Battery B of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, and Battery C of the 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery, were now moved into COLUMBUS.

The enemy broke contact and filtered back into the mountains after suffering tremendous losses. He was pursued with heavy firepower: cannon artillery continually pounded the area;

The division fired 40,464 artillery rounds and rockets during the campaign.

The artillerymen had learned much from this campaign. First, the concept of displacing and supplying artillery by air was proved valid, particularly in support of an airmobile force. During the campaign, artillery units of the cavalry division artillery had made a total of 79 tactical moves-67 of them by air. Continuous air movement by maneuver and support forces unsettled the enemy. Properly executed airmobile operations could keep constant pressure on him, wearing him down and destroying his will to resist. Second, aerial rocket artillery was shown to be extremely responsive and effective in augmenting cannon fires. Ground forces learned that aerial rocket artillery was reliable and extremely accurate, characteristics that were particularly important in close support missions. By controlling helicopter fires through artillery fire support channels, as was done with aerial rocket artillery, cannon and helicopter fires could be closely coordinated by a single individual, thus insuring that both were complementary. Third, artillerymen learned of the necessity of having artillery positions that were mutually supporting. Though Landing Zone COLUMBUS had stood off an enemy attack without mutually supporting artillery, its defenders had required air support, which in poor weather might not have been available. Fourth, because of the rugged terrain and dense foliage, target acquisition was a definite problem. Forward observers were still the best means of target acquisition because they were always with maneuver companies. To augment the forward observers, aerial observers were added whenever possible and were particularly effective in support of overland ground movements. Fifth, it was shown that the 105-mm. howitzer was a particularly good weapon for reconnaissance by fire. As the unit moved, the artillery forward observer would adjust artillery rounds in advance of the unit. This provided two benefits: the artillery could disrupt any activity or ambush site the enemy might have, and the location of the last round fired was a good indicator of the unit's location. This second advantage would allow for rapid delivery of artillery in the event the enemy ambushed the ground force.