Re: Morale Issues
I decided to re-read the accounts of the Battle of the Imjin River, a meeting engagement fought by the British 29th Brigade against vastly superior numbers of Chinese in April 1951. It was a bloodbath...four battalions on a 12,000 yard front, with one, the 1st Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment getting cut off and wiped out. One squadron (company) of Centurion tanks supported the brigade but couldn't reach the Gloucesters on the far left. Another battalion, the Ulsters, was severely mauled. The Besa coax machineguns on the tanks were firing nearly constantly. Many Chinese got run over by the treads. Others who managed to clamber aboard with grenades and sticky bombs were hosed off by fellow tanks' machinegun fire. One tank drove through a building to knock off the Chinese. When the UN troops took casualties, they pulled back...when the Chinese took casualties, they kept on coming, wave after wave, oblivious to the murderous fire of the tanks. I'm sure that seeing their mates getting blasted by the dozen would have had a negative impact on Chinese morale, if it was daytime and they could see the fallen. But it was night action, all they could see were the tanks blazing away, a beacon for them to focus their assault on. Perhaps this was intentional on the part of the Chinese leaders? Or superhuman morale combined with a total disregard for casualties?
The Communist forces in Korea weren't always so superhuman, though. In September 1950 along the Pusan Perimeter, a few days after the Inchon landings, the lack of resupply and a newfound vigor among the UN troops caused the nearly invincible North Koreans to crack and fall apart. They were worn out, underfed, underequipped (resorting to using captured vehicles, weapons, ammo), and no amount of bleating by the Kommissars could prevent the inevitable rout. Many hardened troops fled to the hills and formed guerrilla bands that harrassed UN rear areas for months, whereas South Koreans drafted by the then-victorious North Koreans gladly surrendered to UN forces.
Taking just the experience of the Brits at the Imjin and the North Koreans at the Naktong, it would appear that it took considerably less than 90% casualties to cause one side to break and withdraw. On the other hand, US Marines storming Obong-ni Ridge on 17 August 1950 had a hell of a time...they'd climb all the way to the top of a hill, get knocked back down, then climb it again. The 2nd Battalion 5th Marines suffered 60% casualties in seven hours. One platoon managed to reach the top with 20 of the 30 men it started the attack with; as it did so, machinegun fire caused five more casualties, and the rest were ordered back off the crest. Corsairs were called in, and worked over the North Korean positions, but as soon as the planes were gone, they reoccupied their trenches. As the 15 survivors of the Marine platoon started back up the hill at 50% casualties, they took six more casualties, reducing their numbers to nine effectives. Regaining the crest, the platoon was again forced to retreat. The 2nd Battalion was combat ineffective by 1500 hours, and the 1st Battalion had to pass through them to take the hills of Obong-ni Ridge by nightfall. Seven hours is roughly 140 game turns, and in that time 60% casualties were inflicted on a battalion sized formation, finally rendering them ineffective. That one platoon suffered 70% casualties, but it was still fighting up until that time. But they weren't at 90%, no.
And yes, infantry will attack an armored enemy even when reduced by casualties. Morale tends to be the deciding factor then. Americans in July 1950 had low morale because they just couldn't seem to stop the Red Tide, so when confronted by T-34s had a propensity to run. But not always. When a North Korean tank went tear-assing through downtown Taejon, General Dean saw it, rallied some 3.5 inch bazooka teams, and led them on a tank hunt through the narrow streets of the town. That takes guts.
Basileus
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