What happens in 2025? / new tactics- new technologies

[FASTBOAT TOUGH]

On the shots of the rear of those tanks I'm not seeing any signs of prop guards, props, hydro jets, rudder or raised engine exhaust housing to prevent water from getting into the engine.

It could only operate as an amphib by using it's tracks however, if that's the case I can guarantee it won't operate effectively at all in an ocean environment.

Another limiting is how much armor does it have? On the "face of it" it looks fairly well protected. Below I offer a "case study" of where armor killed it's full amphibious capability. It also brings up a couple of factors I mentioned in my Para 1.
https://web.archive.org/web/20230801...apc/zbd_08.htm

They sort of remind me of the Indonesian version of Turkeys "KAPLAN" medium tank I submitted a few months back.

Regards,
Pat

[DRG]

Originally Posted by FASTBOAT TOUGH

They sort of remind me of the Indonesian version of Turkeys "KAPLAN" medium tank I submitted a few months back.

Regards,
Pat

Yep
Don

[MarkSheppard]

Another reason for the overlarge "boxy" look may be signature reduction (they already have the barrel shrouds) designed to defeat different types of sensors -- if you have a cluttered tank, all the clashing antennas, boxes, etc provide nice high contrast aimpoints for automatic target tracking systems.

[early automatic optical tracking systems from the SA-2 onwards were responsible for the elimination of color insignia and markings from USAF aircraft over the decades]

[MarkSheppard]

https://en.topwar.ru/270448-vintovka...operaciju.html

5 September 2025 article on tactical changes due to the SMO:

The special operation has already rewritten more than one charter. Not only the Russian one, but also the Ukrainian one, and, especially, the NATO one. New realities of combat have emerged at all levels. At the tactical level, a significant transformation of sniper work is observed. In a number of cases, snipers are successfully replaced by ATGM crews. Anti-tank gunners in the special operation have practically no work left for their intended purpose – Tanks gradually moved out of the line of sight.

It takes a long time and a lot of money to train a sniper pair capable of destroying targets at a distance of 1000 meters. Why risk "surgeons" on the battlefield if you can hit an enemy bunker with a thermobaric rocket? And from a much greater distance, excluding the possibility of being hit by return fire. As a result, in a number of cases, long-range truckers with ATGMs were engaged in direct fire support of the assault units. A whole tactic of using missiles was developed, including the use of three types of ATGMs - "Kornet" at long distances, "Konkurs" at medium distances, and in conditionally close combat, "Fagots" are used. Anti-tank missiles in the SVO are an extensive story, which requires separate consideration.

But let's get back to the sniper arms, or rather, to the main subject of the conversation - the SVD or infantry sniper rifle. This material substantiates the idea of ​​​​gradually abandoning the semi-automatic close-combat rifle. There are several reasons at once. The first is that aerial reconnaissance has significantly expanded the "gray zone" where it is simply impossible to equip a position for snipers at a distance of 1000 meters. Therefore, all high-precision small arms now work at distances of one kilometer. And here the SVD simply has nothing to do - its effective firing range does not exceed 300-400 meters. Separately, it is worth noting that even the work of long-range rifles has to be masked by machine gun fire, otherwise the enemy will unmistakably determine the location of a sniper pair. More precisely, not a pair, but a trio and even a five.

For a sniper to work effectively, he now requires not only an observer, but also a machine gunner, a reconnaissance operator drone and even an evacuation group. Snipers on special operations are forced to work most of the time at night. According to surveys of front-line soldiers, up to 80 percent of combat work occurs at night. Through thermal imaging devices, targets look much more contrasting, and the probability of being detected is much lower. Night conditions reduce the effective firing range (even with a high-quality thermal imager), which also does not play in favor of the Marksman SVD.

The second reason for the reduction in the number of SVDs at the front was the transformation of the tactical units of the Russian Army. Previously, the smallest attack unit was a squad, now - pairs and threes of assault aircraft. In a motorized rifle squad, there was a regular position of an infantry sniper with an SVD, who not only supported his unit with high-precision fire, but also went on the offensive himself. Now, no one in their right mind would go on an assault with an SVD. The main purpose of snipers in modern combat is to cut off approaching enemy reserves and destroy machine gun positions, ATGM crews and automatic grenade launchers.

The natural increase in the combat distance in the conditions of a frozen front brought to the fore more accurate weapons with a greater effective range. It is no coincidence that the SVD substitute - the Chukavin sniper rifle with a passport range of 1200 meters (similar to the Dragunov rifle) allows you to work at 500-700 meters, which is more than the Dragunov product. Due to the higher accuracy of fire, first of all. But even the SVCh is very conditionally suitable for the conditions of the SVO. It is in this conventionality that there remains hope for the use of semi-automatic rifles for their intended purpose. Niches for them still remain.

Another specific niche for using the Marksman rifle can be considered the fight against heavy drones. For example, with heavy agricultural UAVs converted to drop mines. "Baba Yaga" usually comes at night, and machine guns with thermal sights are used to defeat her. Not only machine gunners, but also snipers work very effectively against the slow-moving ash-heap. The self-loading SVD allows you to hit "Baba Yaga" at distant borders with the third or fourth shot. This function cannot be neglected, although it is very specific.

[MarkSheppard]

Iron Beam 450 (fits inside a standard shipping container) has apparently finished it's trials with the IDF and may or may not be operational:

https://x.com/RAFAELdefense/status/1968375646716854698

Iron Beam 450 Reaches Final Development and Readiness for Delivery

Rafael, together with Israel’s Ministry of Defense, has completed the final series of trials for the Iron Beam 450, the world’s first operational high-energy laser defense system.

In these landmark tests, Iron Beam 450 intercepted rockets, mortars, and UAVs with unmatched speed, precision, and near-zero cost per engagement — a breakthrough that sets a new global benchmark in air defense.

Powered by Rafael’s pioneering adaptive optics technology and designed for full integration into Israel’s multi-layered defense, Iron Beam 450 delivers extended range, faster response times, and scalability across land, sea, and air.

====================

Actual operational experience from the Saudis with Chinese Lasers:

https://defence-blog.com/saudi-milit...-laser-weapon/

Saudi military slams Chinese laser weapon
Dylan Malyasov
Sep 4, 2025

Saudi Arabia has become one of the first countries in the world to acquire laser-based air defense systems, purchasing China’s SkyShield integrated counter-drone system to protect key sites and expensive air defense assets such as the Patriot from drone attacks.

But operational experience in the kingdom’s harsh environment has revealed serious limitations.

The SkyShield system uses a layered approach that combines counter-drone radars with both “hard kill” and “soft kill” options. Each battery consists of four vehicles: a 3D TWA Radar, an AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) counter-drone radar with three side-facing panels providing 360-degree coverage without rotation; two JN1101 counter-drone jamming vehicles, which feature both interception and electronic jamming capabilities; and the Silent Hunter Laser Directed-Energy Weapon, intended for direct destruction of drones. The radar provides targeting data to both the jamming and laser elements, integrating the system into a single defensive package.

Saudi Arabia procured the SkyShield as part of its broader effort to counter the rising threat of unmanned aerial attacks on critical infrastructure. The system was fielded with assistance from Chinese specialists, and its initial demonstrations showed strong results.

However, a former Saudi military officer who coordinated the project said performance has not met expectations under operational conditions.

“Despite the strong performance demonstrated during trials, in real conditions the SkyShield components have lower effectiveness than promised,” he said.

The Silent Hunter laser, developed by China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), in particular was limited by environmental factors.

“In some cases, it took between 15 and 30 minutes of continuous targeting and laser illumination to guarantee a drone kill,” the officer explained. Dust and sand disrupted optical tracking and weakened the laser beam. Continuous exposure also caused abrasion to the optical systems, while the high desert heat forced much of the system’s power into cooling rather than firing.

Deploying the laser module from its truck-mounted container also took time, slowing the transition from standby to combat mode. Moreover, the weapon required long, flat terrain for clear lines of sight, conditions that are difficult to guarantee across much of Saudi Arabia’s environment.

By contrast, the jamming elements of the SkyShield proved more reliable. The officer noted that “most of the drones engaged in the defended zone were neutralized not by the Silent Hunter but by the JN1101 counter-drone jamming system.”

Saudi officials have asked Beijing to refine the SkyShield for use in hot and dusty climates. Until those improvements are made, the Silent Hunter laser remains limited for sustained deployment.

The experience demonstrates both the potential and the limitations of directed-energy weapons. While lasers promise low-cost, precise shots, they are vulnerable to environmental conditions. In Saudi Arabia, traditional electronic warfare systems like jamming remain the backbone of counter-drone defense.